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 1 
DIVIDING HEDGING AND GAMBLING: LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS 
 
By Chao-hung Christopher Chen 
 
 
 
The past three decades have seen the emergence in the 
market of many different types of “derivative 
instruments”, ranging from futures, forwards, options, 
and swaps 1  to some other hybrid instruments 2  or 
synthetic transactions 3 . Along with insurance, 
derivative instruments help market participants not 
only to hedge various types of risks but also to engage 
in market speculation. A derivative transaction could 
serve the purpose of avoiding large losses (i.e. hedging) 
as well as earning a windfall (i.e. speculation).  As such, 
one question arises: Is there any difference between 
gambling and derivative trading?  
 If A and B make a bet (of 100 pounds) on the 
movement (either up or down) of the FTSE 100 index, 
it is what we generally call a wager. In contrast, if one 
wishes to make speculative profits by placing an order 
in the LIFFE for FTSE 100 index futures, it is 
regarded as an investment. In addition, if A places a bet 
of £10 per point (of the FTSE index) with a betting 
company, it might become a so-called “spread betting”4. 
The above examples share one main scenario - making 
profits by predicting future movements of the FTSE 
100 index. However, when we put them in different 
                                                
The author thanks the reviewer for his valuable comment, 
and Mrs. Miriam Goldby and Mr. Arif Jamal for their helpful 
feedback.  
1 Many chapters could be written simply to describe what 
derivatives are and how they work. We can use oil prices as 
an illustration. An oil forward is a contract to buy (or sell) a 
certain amount of oil to be delivered in the future with the 
price fixed when the contract is made (usually, however, 
these contracts are settled in cash without the oil actually 
being exchanged). An oil future is the standardised version 
of forwards and is traded on an organised exchange.  An oil 
option is a right to buy or sell oil in the future (and the 
option holder has to pay some premiums to the issuer of the 
option). An oil swap involves a series of exchange of 
periodical cash flows based on the oil price and a 
predetermined fixed-rate.  
2 A typical example of hybrid instrument is the Catastrophe 
bond (CAT). It is like a normal bond except that the 
repayment of money is conditional upon the non-occurrence 
of a catastrophic event (e.g. a hurricane). Higher interest is 
usually paid as compensation.  
3 A synthetic transaction can take many forms and can be 
extremely complicated. To give a simple example, a synthetic 
option is not a real option issued by another person, but 
could be a collection of other derivative instruments (e.g. 
options or forwards) that mathematically creates a 
“synthetic” option on the surface.   
4 See City Index Ltd v Leslie [1992] QB 98.  
contexts, they may receive different legal treatment.5 
Furthermore, our perception might change if we vary 
the context within which the transactions take place. 
For example, it might be perfectly normal and an 
accepted part of commercial practice for two banks to 
enter into an interest rate swap. However, if the same 
swap occurs between two individuals who enter into 
this transaction from purely speculative intentions, we 
might start to doubt whether this transaction makes 
any sense and whether it looks more like a gamble. 
 Overall, we can put hedging and traditional 
gambling contracts on the same spectrum. To some 
extent, they are all contracts that allow people to make 
profits or avoid loss from predicting future 
uncertainties. On this spectrum, certain contracts (such 
as wagering) have long been labelled as “gambling”. 
Certain transactions (like insurance) could serve some 
legitimate purposes and are protected from the 
prohibitions in gambling laws with established legal 
doctrines. Derivatives arise in the same context. Like 
insurance, they could help market participants to hedge 
against various types of risk. On the other hand, they 
also open the door for punters to gain speculative 
profits. Indeed, derivative transactions provide us with 
many more options than traditional betting, gaming or 
wagering, etc. This paper does not intend to cover the 
relationship between financial regulations and gambling 
regulations. Nor is this paper interested in discussing 
what should be regulated and how to regulate the 
financial and gambling market. Instead, this paper plans 
to answer one basic question that many people might 
have in mind: what is the difference between risky 
derivative transactions and gambling contracts?  
 We could answer this question from several 
perspectives. This paper will focus on the legal aspect. 
We should be aware that the meaning of the terms 
“derivatives” and “gambling” can be difficult to pin 
down because they are surrounded by ambiguous 
jargon. This paper intends to pierce this fog and 
discuss whether derivatives should be understood 
differently from what we generally perceive as 
“gambling”. In the following sections, we will first 
explain the need to make a distinction between 
derivatives and gambling in the pre-Gambling Act 2005 
era.  We will then examine certain relevant arguments 
and legal doctrines, and the new dimension after the 
new gambling regulatory schemes.  
 
                                                
5 A wager was rendered unenforceable by the old section 18 
of the Gaming Act 1845 and is now legal and enforceable 
after the Gambling Act 2005. Nevertheless, a wager might 
still be unenforceable or illegal in other countries. See for 
example, NY CLS Gen Oblig 5-401. The futures market is 
now protected by the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000. Spread betting is now also put under the surveillance 
of the Financial Services Authority. See section 10 of the 
Gambling Act 2005. However, spreading betting may still 
constitute illegal wagering or gambling in other countries.   
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The Need for Division – Before the Gambling Act 
2005 
 
 
At the beginning, we should be aware of the evils of 
gambling. Gambling attracts much opposition for 
various reasons. Gambling, being described as an 
opportunistic and non-productive behaviour, has 
received much moral condemnation. Apart from 
general moral theory, one primary concern with 
gambling is its association with crime.6 Public order is 
another consideration for the government. 7  A 
significant part of gambling regulations or prohibition 
is to control gambling premises.8 In addition, excessive 
gambling also attracts much attention. Some people do 
become addicted to gambling, and the addiction can 
have a negative impact on their family or surrounding 
people (e.g. astronomical debt). The vulnerability of 
youngsters and children also raises serious concerns. 9 
 The above concerns provide a basis to treat 
gambling differently from other transactions. Over the 
past two hundred years, there have been several pieces 
of legislation being introduced to address various 
problems in connection with gambling.10 The same is 
also true in many other countries. Indeed, gambling has 
largely been seen as a typical example of an “illegal” 
contract. Yet, this perception is not accurate. Legal 
consequences of gambling could range from mere civil 
unenforceability11 to criminal sanctions.12 Nevertheless, 
as long as gambling still invites negative legal 
consequences, we have to distinguish certain 
transactions that we deem legitimate from gambling, 
even though they might contain a certain degree of 
speculation. Then the question is: how to achieve the 
goal? 
 
                                                
6 Whether gambling really leads to more crimes is an issue 
that requires further empirical studies. See also Royal 
Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming, Report of the 
Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming 1949-1951 
(London: HMSO, 1951), p.52. 
7 Gambling Act 2005, section 1(a).  
8 For example, the Gambling Act 2005, section 37 and Part 8; 
the Betting, Gaming, and Lotteries Act 1963, section 1.  
9 Gambling Act 2005, section 1(c).  
10 To name a few, past legislation includes the Gaming Act 
1710, the Gaming Act 1845, the Street Betting Act 1853, the 
Gaming Act 1892, the Street Betting Act 1906, the 
Racecourse Betting Act 1928, the Betting and Lotteries Act 
1934, the Pool Betting Act 1954, the Betting and Gaming 
Act 1960, the Betting Levy Act 1961, the Betting, Gaming 
and Lotteries Act 1963, the Gaming Act 1968, the Lotteries 
and Amusements Act 1976, the Gaming (Bingo) Act 1985, 
and the National Lottery Act 1993, etc. 
11 See section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845 (abolished by 
section 334 of the Gambling Act 2005). See also Life 
Assurance Act 1774, section 1. 
12 For example, the State of Illinois in the U.S. imposes a 
general prohibition of gambling in the criminal code.  
Approach I: Definition of Gambling 
 
 
The first step is to define the meaning of the term 
“gambling”. If certain conduct does not come within 
the definition of gambling, it is not gambling as a 
matter of law and thus avoids negative legal 
consequences of gambling. This task looks simple, but 
it is indeed a difficult one. As we will explain below, it 
would be labourious to define “gambling” in clear and 
unequivocal words. Since we could hardly make a clear 
definition of gambling, it would be equally difficult to 
distinguish lawful transactions from gambling by way 
of a simple definition.  
 Before the Gambling Act 2005, there was no 
single definition of “gambling”. Instead, gambling law 
used various terms, such as betting, wagering, gaming, 
etc., to describe certain behaviours. The most 
fundamental type is what we call “wagering”13. People 
can also gamble by playing a game (e.g. a poker 
game).14 Betting is a term that could contain a wide 
variety of gambling behaviours, ranging from fixed-
odds betting (with a bookmaker), pool-betting (e.g. a 
horse race totalisator), to spread betting (of financial 
indices).15 Lottery is another common type of gambling. 
Yet even a lottery may contain several types of games.16  
 These concepts could overlap with one 
another, which makes it more difficult to find a 
definition. As Lord Wilberforce observed, “[i]t is 
impossible to frame accurate definitions which can 
cover every such variety; attempts to do so may indeed 
be counter-productive, since each added precision 
merely provides an incentive to devise a variant which 
eludes it. So the legislation contains a number of 
expressions which are not, or not precisely, defined: bet, 
wager, lottery, gaming, are examples of this.”17  
 A standard dictionary definition says that 
gambling means “to play games of chance for money, 
esp. for unduly high stakes; to stake money (esp. to an 
extravagant amount) on some fortuitous event.”18 A 
game of chance is to play with future uncertainties, 
which, in commercial term, might be called “risk”. 
Thus, if we reduce the discussion to neutral terms, 
what we generally perceive as gambling is where a 
person places some stakes and expects to earn some 
money following an external determining factor (e.g. 
luck, a football match, a game, or the movement of the 
                                                
13 The classic definition of “wagering” was given by Hawkins 
J in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1892] 2 QB 484, at 
490-491. 
14 Gambling Act 2005, sections 6-8. 
15 Gambling Act 2005, sections 9-13.  
16 For example, apart from the lottery we generally see on 
TV, a scratch card is called “lottery”. See Gambling Act 2005, 
sections 14 &15 and Schedule 2. 
17 Seay v Eastwood [1976] 3 All ER 153, at 155.  
18  Oxford English Dictionary Online 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/uk> [accessed 11 August 2006]. 
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market, etc.) with the understanding that he may lose 
his stakes if things do not go as he wishes.  
The same is also true in trading derivatives. For 
example, a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap, in 
essence, is similar to a series of bets on the movement 
of interest rate. Although an interest rate swap can be 
seen as a series of set-offs of fixed-rate payments 
against floating payments (based on an agreed notional 
amount), the result of an interest rate swap is as if the 
floating rate payer will pay only if the floating rate is 
higher than the fixed rate, and vice versa for the fixed 
rate payer. Thus, an interest rate swap might be seen as 
a series of bets on interest rates. The fixed-rate payer 
bets that the market interest rate would be higher than 
the fixed rate, and vice versa for the floating rate payer. 
As Lord Goff observed, “[i]nterest rate swaps can fulfil 
many purposes, ranging from pure speculation to more 
useful purposes such as the hedging of liabilities. They 
are in law wagers, but they are not void as such because 
they are excluded from the regime of the Gaming Acts 
by section 63 of the Financial Services Act 1986.”19  
 Instead of making a uniform definition to 
describe “gambling”, the Gambling Act 2005 only lists 
a range of conducts that constitute regulated 
“gambling”.20 This approach is practical, but it does 
not make clear what is gambling in nature and what is 
not. The same is also true for subcategories such as 
betting, gaming, and wagering, etc. Statutory language 
provides guidance for regulatory purposes, but they do 
not provide a dividing line.  
 
 
 
Approach II: Market Function of Speculation 
 
 
Another theory is to distinguish “speculation” from 
“gambling”. The reason is that speculation can help to 
make the market (i.e. to meet the demand of hedgers) 
while gambling cannot. 21  This theory particularly 
applies to the financial and commodity markets. 22 This 
                                                
19 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough 
Council [1996] AC 669, at 680. In Morgan Grenfell v Welwyn 
Hatfield District Council, Hobhouse J also observed that 
“[s]ince they provide for the payment of differences they are 
capable of being entered into by two parties with the 
purpose of wagering upon future interest rates.” [1995] 1 All 
ER 1, at 8. 
20 Gambling Act 2005, section 3.  
21 David Mier, Regulating Commercial Gambling: Past, Present, and 
Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 6. 
22 Aranson and Miller distinguished insurance, speculation, 
and gambling as the three forms of activities with explicit 
assessment of risk. They seemed to compare “speculation” 
with the kind of risk-taking activities in the futures market. 
Apparently, the meaning of “speculation” is more limited if 
we confine it to futures markets.  Peter H. Aranson & Roger 
LeRoy Miller, “Economic Aspects of Public Gaming”, 12 
Conn. L. Rev. 822 (1980), 831, 833-835. 
approach is persuasive if we contrast speculative 
futures trading in an exchange and a bucket shop 
transaction (i.e. off-exchange futures trading). Indeed, 
speculators play an important role in meeting the 
demands of risk-averse parties. Without their presence, 
the volume of trading could be greatly reduced and 
transaction costs might prevent a party from finding a 
suitable counterparty to conduct hedging.  
 There are three points we can make regarding 
this argument. First, the market-making function does 
not change the fact that market speculation is a kind of 
behaviour to make opportunistic profits. Whether the 
law should allow a certain degree of speculation in the 
market because of the market-making function is 
another matter. Secondly, gambling could also provide 
some market function. With the help of betting 
exchanges, a bookmaker can also hedge his own risk or 
make the odds market by betting with another 
bookmaker.23 Arguably, a bookmaker is like a market 
maker in the betting market in this situation. He can 
also be a bridge between two punters. Thirdly, 
speculation, though necessary in the financial market, 
might not be allowed beyond a certain boundary.24 Like 
gambling, market speculation could still be excessive. 
How much speculation should be tolerated in the 
market requires further analysis. Thus, it is not 
convincing to distinguish speculators and gamblers 
merely from their market-making function. After all, 
speculation in the market and gambling on financial 
markets are both opportunistic transactions which aim 
to make profits from market fluctuation.  
 In sum, as far as market is concerned, public 
policy may dictate that a certain degree of speculation 
should be tolerated. Similarly, gambling could well be 
allowed to boost local economy25 or for the purpose of 
promoting good causes 26 . In addition, market 
speculation, if not regulated by the Financial Services 
Authority, might still come within the ambit of 
Gambling Act 2005. 27  We do not doubt that 
speculation could serve certain market-making function. 
Nevertheless, this function alone does not itself 
distinguish “market speculation” from gambling. A 
derivative instrument, if used for speculation, is not 
different from gambling.  
 
                                                
23 See below note 30. 
24 For example, the US commodity regulations impose a 
daily limit a trader can trade in a futures exchange. 7 USCA 
6a & 6i; 17 CFR 150.2.  
25 In the United States, casinos are sometimes allowed in 
order to boost local economy (e.g. in the State of Nevada) or 
to support minority (e.g. casinos operated by Indians in 
California). 
26 For example, the National Lottery has so far raised more 
than 18 billion pounds. See http://www.national-
lottery.co.uk/player/p/goodcauses/fundraising.do [accessed 
20 October 2006]. 
27 Gambling Act 2005, section 10(2).  
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Approach III: Justifying Hedging and Insurance: 
Conceptual Attempts 
 
 
Instead of defining “gambling”, another way is to 
justify certain transactions as lawful business so that we 
can temporarily ignore the meaning of gambling. While 
gambling attracts much criticism, judges seem to take 
“hedging” as a legitimate commercial purpose. 28 
Compared with extra risk taking, risk avoidance 
receives less moral condemnation. The long history of 
insurance law suggests that minimising the impact of 
loss originating from a future event is acceptable. 
Although in theory the same risk is merely redistributed 
to other people, there is more “positive” value in 
reducing the impact of future hazards from the 
hedger’s view. A justification for hedging and insurance 
could come from three aspects: conceptual arguments, 
proprietary connections and the subjective intention of 
both parties. Here we will explore the conceptual level.  
 First, one can make an argument that an 
uncertainty in gambling can otherwise cause no harm, 
while in a hedge a person is exposed to potential loss if 
the risk is realised.29 Though this statement might be 
true in most circumstances, it is not always correct. The 
outcome of gambling does not always depend on luck, 
but is sometimes determined by the result of an 
external factor that could cause harm. Take sports 
betting as example. The owner of a losing horse might 
have some incentives to compensate for his 
expenditures should his horse not win a race. Is it not 
hedging if the horse owner opts for fixed odds betting 
or spread betting to cover his potential loss? Moreover, 
a punter who places a bet on a sporting event may have 
incentives to hedge his bet by simply making a contrary 
bet. That is what a bookmaker is doing.30 Therefore, 
although we may distinguish a lottery or a pure wager 
on the basis that the uncertainty can otherwise cause 
no harm, there is a grey area where hedging and 
gambling cross each other.  
 Secondly, another argument is that by hedging 
a person is exporting uncertainty in return for certainty, 
whereas by gambling a punter actively and intentionally 
increases his own risk exposure. This statement is 
                                                
28 See City Index v Leslie [1992] QB 98, at 112 (per Leggatt LJ); 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough 
Council [1996] AC 669, at 680 (per Lord Goff).  
29 Peter H. Aranson & Roger LeRoy Miller, “Economic 
Aspects of Public Gaming”, 12 Conn. L. Rev. 822 (1980), 
834.   
30 A bookmaker who receives bets from punters can actually 
place a bet in a betting exchange or with another bookmaker 
(a hedging bet) so as to shift his risk exposure from the 
punters’ bets to other bookmakers. This situation is 
somewhat similar to the reinsurance market or back-to-back 
swaps. See David Mier, Regulating Commercial Gambling: Past, 
Present, and Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 
6 note 23. 
probably true when we try to describe certain types of 
behaviour, but it misses the point that hedging is 
frequently itself a risky transaction. A hedger may have 
to take extra risks in order to hedge another 
transaction.31 Indeed, a hedger faces two situations: to 
hedge a risk or not to hedge. On the one hand, if he 
decides to find a cover for potential loss, more than 
likely he has to pay something in return (e.g. an 
insurance premium). If the unfavourable event does 
occur in the future, the gain in the hedge is used to 
cover his loss. In contrast, if the event does not occur, 
with hindsight the money he pays for the hedge 
virtually becomes a loss. Thus, a hedge contains a 
certain degree of speculation in itself, even though it is 
used to cover another risk. Even with careful analysis 
in advance, a deal intended as a hedge might still result 
in huge losses.32 
 In addition, one can use a typical gambling 
transaction (e.g. spread betting) to reach the same 
hedging goals. Whether a transaction looks like hedging 
or tilts toward gambling is not determined by whether a 
party exchanges uncertainties for certainties (or vice 
versa), but rather by how the general public perceives 
certain types of behaviour and how a party uses a 
particular transactional structure to achieve his goals. 
The above-mentioned arguments, though promising in 
some regards, fail to provide a clear answer.  
 
 
 
Approach IV: Proprietary Interests: Insurable 
Interest Test 
 
 
As Lord Mansfield stated, “insurance is a contract 
upon speculation”33. The development of insurance 
law has coincided with the increasing control over 
gambling. Since insurance has great resemblance to 
betting on a person’s life or property, the insurable 
interest test has been developed to separate lawful 
insurance policies from wagering or gaming. An 
insurance policy is not enforceable if the assured does 
not have “insurable interest” in the subject matter of 
the insurance policy. Regardless of the question 
whether derivatives might be defined as insurance, the 
insurable interest test gives us some insight of how to 
distinguish lawful contracts from gambling. If, for 
example, we focus on property insurance, then we need 
to examine the proprietary interests a person holds in 
relationship to a property 
 To constitute an “insurable interest”, “a 
person is interested … where he stands in any legal or 
                                                
31 At least, a hedger is still exposed to the credit risk of the 
counterparty.  
32 See for example, Procter & Gamble Co v Bankers Trust Co, 
925 F.Supp. 1270 (S.D.Ohio 1996).  
33 Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905. See also the Preamble of 
the Life Assurance Act 1774. 
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equitable relation to … any insurable property at risk 
therein, in consequence of which he may benefit by the 
safety or due arrival of insurable property, or may be 
prejudiced by its loss, or damage thereto, or by the 
detention thereof, or may incur liability in respect 
thereof.”34 In short, an insurable interest might be seen 
as an “insurable relationship”.35 A policy is less likely to 
resemble gambling if the insured has a relationship with 
the person or the thing being insured. Indeed, wagering 
or gambling continues to be a major concern.36 The 
insurable interest test, along with the indemnity nature 
of property insurance 37 , ensures that an insurance 
policy would not become a wager because an assured 
must suffer certain kinds of loss to his property in 
order to claim compensation from an insurer, and thus 
reduces the chance of moral hazards.  
 To determine whether an assured has an 
insurable interest in the property insured, two tests 
have been devised. The traditional way is to define an 
insurable interest by legal or equitable ownership, and 
is known as the “legal interest” test.38 On the other 
hand, the “factual expectancy” test has been developed 
to cope with the restrictiveness of the legal interest 
test.39 The factual expectancy test allows a person to 
insure his business or future proprietary interests, even 
though he is not a legal or equitable owner of the 
property. The difference between the two approaches 
could best be illustrated by cases regarding insurance of 
a company’s property by its shareholders.40 Although 
the factual expectancy test seems to be more popular in 
other common law jurisdictions,41 the English law still 
insists on the legal interest test.42 
                                                
34 Marine Insurance Act 1906, section 5(2).  
35  See Bertram Harnett & John V. Thorton, “Insurable 
Interest in Property: A Socio-economic Re-evaluation of A 
Legal Concept”, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 1162 (1948); Malcolm 
Clarke, Policies and Perceptions of Insurance: An Introduction to 
Insurance Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), p. 20.  
36 The term “wager” or “wagering” was used frequently in 
cases regarding insurable interests. For example, see Wilson v 
Jones (1867) LR 2 Ex 139; Moran, Galloway & Co v Uzielli 
[1905] 2 KB 555; Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada 
[2002] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 492; O’Kane v Jones (The “Martin P”) 
[2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 389.  
37 Property insurance is a contract of indemnity in nature, 
which means that a policy is issued to cover real loss of an 
assured. If there is no loss, there is no compensation. In 
contrast, a life assurance is described as a contract of 
contingency.  
38 See Lucena v Craufurd (1806) 2 Bos & PNR 269 (per Lord 
Eldon).  
39 Id., at 302-3 (per Lawrence J).  
40 Cf. Macaura v Northern Assurance [1925] AC 619; Wilson v 
Jones (1867) LR 2 Ex 139; and Constitution Insurance Company of 
Canada v Kosmopoulos (1847) 34 DLR (4th) 208. 
41 See generally Lowry & Rawlings, “Re-thinking Insurable 
Interest” in Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, ed. by 
Sarah Worthington (Oxford: Hart, 2003); Julie-Anne Tarr, 
 In relationship to derivatives, we find that the 
indemnity nature and the insurable interest test are not 
applicable. Unlike insurance, modern derivatives are 
more about market fluctuation than hazards associated 
with a specific person or property. Nor does the 
modern market hedging require a hedger to hold the 
underlying commodities, securities or whatever assets 
the risk of which he intends to hedge against. Price 
differences are the subject-matter rather than 
proprietary damage. From a more practical point of 
view, most of the current derivatives market would 
simply wither away if we expect a hedger to be the legal 
or equitable owner of the underlying assets.  
 The factual expectancy test seems to be a 
better fit. Nevertheless, the “factual expectancy” in 
property insurance is still constructed on certain kinds 
of proprietary interest, if not as strict as legal or 
equitable ownership. Thus, in a property insurance 
policy we can examine the expectation of the insured 
based on his interest in a certain property or a 
project. 43  In contrast, the same basis might not be 
applicable to modern hedging. For example, while 
buying or selling futures for grain in the current season 
seems to fit reasonably well into the factual expectancy 
test, hedging grain of the next season (or even the 
season after), which might not be seeded yet, looks 
more dubious. Virtually anything can be justified if the 
“factual expectancy” is laid out too broadly.  
 Perhaps what is more revealing is the 
indemnity nature of property insurance and the 
meaning of “loss”. The most straightforward reference 
for “loss” is damage to property. However, damage can 
appear in various forms. It may mean the cost of 
restoring the property to the original condition44, the 
drop in value of the damaged property45, loss of profit 
or economic loss46, price differences after the breach of 
a contract of sale47, and even damage for psychiatric 
illness.48 In insurance law, the “loss” may not go as far 
as emotional damage, but may contain damage, 
expenses and loss of profit.49  
                                                                             
Disclosure and Concealment in Consumer Insurance Contracts 
(London: Cavendish, 2002).  
42 See Macaura v Northern Assurance [1925] AC 619; See also 
Lowry & Rawlings, id., p. 347-354.  
43 For example, Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd v Hepburn [1966] 1 All 
ER 418 (cigarettes in a warehouse and the carrier); Petrofina 
(UK) Ltd v Magnaload Ltd [1984] QB 127; [1983] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 91 (subcontractor in a building project); Mark Rowlands 
Ltd v Berni Inns [1986] QB 211 (tenant un-named in the 
policy and building insurance).  
44 See Bacon v Cooper (Metals) Ltd [1982] 1 All ER 397.  
45  The relationship between the costs to repair and the 
differences in value is not always an easy one. See Ruxley 
Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC 344.  
46 See Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners [1964] AC 465.  
47 Sale of Goods Act 1979, sections 50 & 51.  
48 For example, Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155; White v Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455.  
49 See Wilson v Jones (1867) LR 2 Ex 139.  
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 In contrast, the “loss” that derivatives could 
hedge against is different in certain regards. First, the 
“loss” that a hedge would cover does not necessarily 
occur following an event. The payment in an index 
forward or an interest rate swap is determined by 
market movement rather than an event causing the 
“loss”. The so-called credit derivative comes closest to 
insurance or event-caused “loss”. In a typical credit 
default swap (CDS) for a corporate bond, if the 
reference event (e.g. non-payment of interests) occurs, 
the risk-buyer has to pay the loss in value of the bond 
or simply buys the bond from the risk-seller at the par 
value. It looks similar to insurance because the liability 
of one party hinges upon the happening of an event. 
However, what differentiates a CDS from a credit 
insurance policy, a contract for guarantee or a security 
interest is that is that the payment under a standard 
CDS refers to the differences between the face value of 
the bond and its current market price rather than the 
unpaid obligation of the principal debtor.  
 Secondly, in the hedging world, the “loss” 
frequently means merely the price differential. The 
“loss” might be virtual because it exists only on paper. 
For example, a shareholder might find his overall 
investment shrinking if prices of the shares in his 
portfolio drop. The price differences can be counted as 
a “loss” on paper or for accounting or tax purposes. 
However, as long as the shareholder still holds the 
shares, the “loss” is not realised. The book loss might 
later become a gain if the share price moves up again. 
In another example, a buyer who purchases Brent 
crude oil in August 2005 in the spot market might find 
the price is much more expensive than 6 months earlier 
(if he had a choice to buy on February 2005). It is a loss 
in the sense that the buyer makes a bad decision as to 
the purchase time, but it is not close to any legal 
meaning of “loss” as described above.  
 Thirdly, frequently in a hedging contract the 
payment is not conditional upon the suffering of “loss”. 
Price differences are paid as it is stated in the contract. 
The concept of hedging may be closer to 
“compensation” than “indemnity”. From a market 
participant’s point of view, it is hard to imagine that a 
hedge exists only to indemnify the damages he has 
suffered. Indeed, the concept of “loss” in the context 
of modern hedging is not limited to property damage 
or the loss of profits following an event. It is closer to a 
life assurance whose purpose is to compensate the 
assured (or other beneficiaries) for future contingencies 
than it is to property insurance, which indemnifies the 
“loss” to a property. Nevertheless, there is a much 
stronger moral hazard arguments (e.g. the increased 
chance of murder of the assured) in the context of life 
assurance that cannot be applied by analogy to 
derivative instruments. Thus, life assurance and 
derivatives are not totally comparable.  
 In sum, the insurable interest test has been 
developed in the special context of insurance, whereas 
a policy is described as a contract of indemnity (for 
property insurance) and an established insurer acts as a 
risk-buyer. This context cannot be applied to other 
hedging contracts. The factual expectation test, though 
broader than the legal interest test, still refers to 
damage to property. Modern hedging practice is 
apparently wider than merely property damage and 
refers to broader economic losses. Regardless of the 
problem whether derivatives are insurance, the 
insurable interest test developed in property insurance 
is too narrow to suit modern derivatives trading. 
Whether the Gambling Act 2005 might affect the 
insurable interest test in insurance law is another issue 
that might be developed in the future.   
 
 
 
Approach V: Purpose of a Transaction 
 
 
Next, we need to turn to the intention of both parties. 
For example, to determine whether a contract was 
unenforceable under the old section 18 of the Gaming 
Act 1845, both parties had to intend the transaction to 
be gaming or wagering. 50 If the transaction served any 
other legitimate purpose, it was not a gaming or 
wagering contract.51 It must be that all parties to a 
transaction intend it to be gaming or wagering. Thus, in 
the stock market, even if the investor intends to 
“gamble” on the market without any intention of 
taking the shares, it does not make the transaction a 
gamble as long as the broker intends it to be a real 
sale.52   
 While being flexible, the intention or purpose 
test still has some shortcomings. On the one hand, it is 
subject to evidence and can sometimes be quite 
arbitrary. Given the relatively uncertain definition of 
“gambling”, the intention to hedging, gambling, 
wagering or gaming lacks clarity for the same reason. 
On the other hand, should the court examine the real 
intention or purpose of parties or simply look at the 
purported ones?   
 In addition, a transaction might have multiple 
purposes. English courts seem to take a practical 
approach to vindicate a transaction as long as there is 
another legitimate purpose in addition to gambling.53 
                                                
50 See Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1892] 2 QB 484; 
Universal Stock Exchange v Strachan [1896] AC 166; City Index 
Ltd v Leslie [1992] QB 98; Morgan Grenfell v Welwyn Hatfield 
District Council [1995] 1 All ER 1.  
51 Earl Ellesmere v Wallace [1929] 2 Ch 1, at 25 (per Lord 
Hanworth).  
52 See Thacker v Hardy 4 QBD 685 (1878); Universal Stock 
Exchange v Strachan [1896] AC 166.  
53 See Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1892] 2 QB 484; 
Universal Stock Exchange, Ltd v Strachan [1896] AC 166; City 
Index Ltd v Leslie [1992] QB 98; Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd v 
Welwyn Hatfield District Council [1995] 1 All ER 1 
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However, what if the legitimate purpose is so marginal 
in a transaction that it is merely a screen for gambling? 
Should the court balance the weight of different 
purposes? A more objective approach to intention 
might solve this problem by reviewing the totality of 
circumstances rather than merely relying on what one 
party thinks. Such an approach might also help to put 
more substance into the purpose of hedging. However, 
while we may recognise the combination of speculation 
and hedging in one transaction, it is eventually up to 
legislators or judges to decide how much speculation is 
acceptable and how much will come within the range 
of so-called “gambling”.  
 The search for the exact meaning of gambling 
(of any kind) and the intention to gamble is like a 
tautology. It is hard to define an intention to gamble 
because it is not clear what gambling is, and on the 
other hand it is difficult to define a clear range of 
transactions as “gambling” because it partly depends 
on the intention of both parties in such transactions. It 
might be easy in some typical cases, but it might be a 
problem if new contracts appear. However, while the 
Gambling Act 2005 does not make any distinction 
between hedging and gambling (or betting, gaming, 
etc.), the intention or purpose test is still the most 
flexible option if we need such a distinction.  
 
 
 
Conclusion: After the Gambling Act 2005? 
 
 
In the above sections, we have illustrated several 
approaches to distinguish lawful hedging derivative 
transactions from gambling. However, no one single 
approach is perfect to suit the derivatives market. On 
the one hand, gambling is difficult to define, and thus is 
difficult to be distinguished from derivatives trading 
generally. On the other, derivative instruments could 
be used to hedge risks as well as to bet on market 
movement. Both purposes could co-exist in a 
transaction at the same time. Thus, it is difficult to 
classify a single class of derivative transactions as lawful 
hedging without including speculative deals.  
 The Gambling Act 2005 does change the scene. 
There is no longer a need to force a derivative 
transaction out of the concept of “gambling” in order 
to avoid negative legal consequences. Instead, the focus 
now may shift to how to control speculative 
transactions without compromising their hedging 
functions. Yet, our discussion is still meaningful for 
several reasons in the post-Gambling Act 2005 era.  
 First, legal risks remain where most countries 
other than the U.K. still penalise gambling. The 
Gambling Act 2005 could not provide a perfect safe 
harbour to a truly international and well-connected 
derivative market. We still need a valid argument to 
distinguish certain transactions from what we see as 
“gambling”. Secondly, while hedging seems to be 
accepted as legitimate, speculation is not. Even if 
gambling becomes legal, it does not mean that 
speculation is always desirable. 54  Dividing derivative 
transactions intended for hedging from purely 
speculative ones may still be meaningful under the 
financial regulation.  
 Thirdly, the Gambling Act 2005 creates a 
comprehensive licensing scheme for those who plan to 
carry on a gambling business. Thus, what is gambling 
(and what is not) remains an important issue for this 
regulatory purpose. As we have argued above, the 
definition of “gambling” in the Gambling Act 2005 is 
broad enough to cover a wide range of speculative 
derivative transactions. While gambling laws do not 
provide a safe harbour for those transactions that serve 
“hedging” or other legitimate purposes, a conceptual 
distinction might be necessary.  
Fourthly, the financial market innovates quickly. So 
does the gambling industry. More “financial betting” 
might arise with the same financial technique. It is 
necessary to realise the similarity or difference between 
derivatives and gambling so that we can fully assess 
further regulatory issues. 55  Lastly, studying whether 
derivatives are a type of gambling would help us to 
recognise the value of derivatives. From here, we may 
then appreciate both how useful derivative transactions 
might be and at the same time how much damage they 
might cause.   
 If we accept that market speculation and 
gambling are in essence the same thing, we have to 
work on the difference between hedging and 
speculation/gambling to identify derivative transactions 
for hedging (or in other words, we are still interested in 
how to define “hedging”). As we argued above, the 
insurable interest test in insurance law attempts to 
distinguish insurance from gambling by examining the 
proprietary or personal relationship of the assured. 
However, this approach is too limited to suit the 
modern hedging market. The intention test (Approach 
V) still seems to be the best option. Nevertheless, more 
substance might have to be injected to create a more 
comprehensive test rather than relying on the 
subjective intention of either or both parties. In short, 
we have to put more efforts on constructing what is a 
“hedge” in order to give the “intention to hedge” a 
more substantive meaning in law.  
                                                
54 For example, the U.S. law imposes a daily position trading 
limit in the futures market unless one can prove that he is a 
bona fide hedger. See 7 USCA 6a and 17 CFR 150.1 et seq. 
55 In fact, before the Gambling Act 2005 spread betting 
business was subject to dual regulatory control under both 
gambling laws (as a bookmaker) and financial regulations. 
The Gambling Act 2005 has resolved this overlap by leaving 
spread betting to the Financial Services Authority. 
Nevertheless, new problems may continue to arise when new 
“gambling” products are created with techniques learnt from 
derivatives.  
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 English law takes the lead in legalising private 
gambling and removes the legal risk of off-exchange 
derivative transactions. Other major countries have not 
followed. As new derivative instruments continue to be 
created into the market, we are looking forward to 
further development in both the gambling law and 
financial law to create more legal certainty to major 
market players and ordinary punters.  
 
© Chao-hung Christopher Chen, 2006 
PhD Final, Law (Contractual and Regulatory Issues of Derivatives 
Trading). 
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